A new era in the dynamics of European integration? by Hanusch, Horst & Balzat, Markus
 0
 
 
A new era in the dynamics of European integration?  
 
 
 
Horst Hanusch  and Markus Balzat  
 
Beitrag Nr. 261, Mai 2004 
A new era in the dynamics of European integration?1 
 
Horst Hanusch♣ and Markus Balzat♠ 
Faculty of Economics, University of Augsburg, Germany 
Abstract 
In the previous decades, the European Union (EU) has succeeded in integrating new 
member countries, in economic and in political respects. Three main reasons lie behind this 
successful integration process: First, the solidarity of richer EU members with their poorer 
counterparts, second, the effectiveness of the integration policies conducted by the EU, and 
third, the willingness of new member countries to arouse and accomplish an economic catch-
up process towards EU average levels. 
With the enlargement by ten new members in May 2004, the EU is facing the biggest 
challenge in its history. Thereby, the population of the Union will rise by 25%, while its 
overall GDP will increase by merely 5%. Apart from the economic problems that may emerge 
because of this discrepancy, further difficulties may arise because some of the new entrants 
are former centrally planned economies that have not yet completed their transformation 
processes towards free market-economies.  
In this paper, we want to investigate whether the Union may be moving towards a new era 
in the dynamics of integration. In doing so, we will analyze some of the main challenges the 
EU will be confronted with in the near future. In detail, we have identified two types of 
challenges. On the one hand, these are in ernal challenges, being closely related to the 
structural adjustments of the Union. We will further differentiate these internal challenges 
into economic and political ones. On the other hand, there exist external challenges that 
predominantly concern the competitiveness of European countries in a global context. With 
regard to these external challenges, we will only deal with economic aspects. 
t
                                                     
One of the main findings of our analysis is that the EU will have to manage a highly difficult 
trade-off between the stimulation of Union-wide economic convergence and international 
competitiveness of its member countries. In the short-run, the process of European 
integration can well be deepened, given that the current controversies with regard to the 
financing of European support programs for poorer members and with regard to the 
implementation of a new constitution for the EU will be resolved. In the long-run, even if 
these controversies can be remedied, it appears likely that the dynamic process of European 
integration will not proceed as smoothly and as successfully as it did in the past. That is 
because the economic disparities across EU member countries have never been larger, and 
because the "development funds" now need to be distributed among a larger number of 
countries than in the past. Apart from these difficulties, it can be expected that the 
concentration on intra-European integration processes will be harmful to the international 
competitive strength of the entire Union, especially when this colossus confederation fails to 
take account of the economic desires of its strongest members. Certainly, the strongest 
nations within the Union are exposed to the pressures of international competition among 
highly developed nations on the basis of innovation and productivity. This kind of 
competition can be described as a Schumpeterian competition.  
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In the light of all these aspects, there are indications that a European Union of "two 
velocities" will emerge, whereby a core of countries will mainly pursue the objective to 
strengthen their international competitiveness, while the remaining members will be 
struggling to accomplish an economic catch-up process to intra-European standards. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The EU is facing the biggest challenge in its history, namely the enlargement by ten 
new member countries. Thereby, the population of the Union will rise by some 25 
percent, while its overall GDP will go up by merely 5 percent. In addition to this 
discrepancy, some of the new entrants are former centrally planned economies that 
are still going through a structural transformation process that is aimed to implement 
the framework conditions of free market-economies.  
Within the previous decades, the economic and political integration of new member 
countries into the European Union can be regarded successful processes. Three main 
factors have made it possible to accomplish these integration processes. These are 
first the solidarity of richer EU members with their poorer counterparts, second, the 
effectiveness of the integration policies conducted by the EU and third, the willing-
ness of new member countries to arouse and accomplish an economic catch-up pro-
cess towards EU average levels. 
But never before have so many countries joined the Union, and never before have 
the economic gaps between old and new member countries been greater. The 
question thus is if these determining factors will work as well in the upcoming 
situation as they did in the previous decades when the EU has been enlarged. To 
answer this question, we want to refer to the challenges that the Union will have to 
face in the near future. If these challenges are too demanding and strong, a new era 
in the dynamics of European integration may arise. 
To deal with these issues, we identify two types of challenges, namely internal and 
external challenges. While the internal challenges - being both economic and political 
in nature - are closely related to the structural adjustment of the Union itself, the 
external challenges that we analyze predominantly concern the economic 
competitiveness of single EU members and of the entire Union in a global context. 
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Our analysis will start with the Union’s internal, institutional problems that character-
ize too well its current situation. In essence, these problems are partly economic and 
partly political in nature. While the Union’s economic problems are closely linked to 
the intended enlargement, its political problems spring from the necessity to imple-
ment a new political constitution. 
After having analyzed these internal problems, we will turn to some external 
challenges and hence discuss those aspects that are closely linked with international 
competitiveness. 
 
 
2. Current internal challenges in the European Union 
2.1 Economic challenges: Eastern enlargement of the EU 
The enlargement of the European Union is no novelty in its history. Since the ratifica-
tion of the Roman Treaty in 1957 by its six founding nations (Belgium, France Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), the EU has been enlarged several 
times.2  
Until now, the continuous expansion of the Union has been accompanied by and has 
lead to an ever deeper economic integration in Europe, so that this process can be 
considered as a great success. If we measure this success in terms of GDP per capita 
levels across EU countries (see chart below), we observe that there is strong cross-
national3 convergence in large parts of the Union. Even those member countries that 
have only joined the EU in the late 1980s and that had been relatively poor prior to 
their membership have managed to catch up tremendously in the meantime.  
But what are the reasons for this astonishing and successful European integration 
process? From an economic perspective, three main aspects can be mentioned. 
These are the solidarity of prosperous EU member countries, the effectiveness of the 
                                                     
2 In detail, Denmark, Ireland and the UK became members in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, 
while Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in the year 1995. 
 3
3 However, GDP per capita levels (still) are much more disparate on the regional level. The effectiveness of the 
policy measures taken by the EU in order to enhance EU-wide convergence has therefore been criticized by 
Boldrin and Canova (2001). A lack of inter-regional convergence in Europe has also been found by Gianetti 
(2002), Cappelen et al. (1999) and others. 
integration policy measures of the EU and finally the internal dynamics in new 
member countries.  
In the following, these three aspects will be briefly addressed and critically analyzed, 
considering especially their potential effects on the possible development of an 
enlarged European Union in the near future. 
 
GDP per capita relative to the average level of the EU-15
(EU-15 = 100, all values for the year 2002)
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Chart 1:  GDP per capita levels in the member countries of the EU-15 relative to the average level 
 of the EU-15, 2002.4 
 
a)  The solidarity of the "donating countries"5 
                                                     
In the past, one of the most important factors of success has been the sustaining 
willingness of richer EU members to support their poorer counterparts. This solidarity, 
which is of course contingent upon the ability of a small group of countries to 
support poorer EU members, also had a major impact on the EU as a political entity. 
Due to this solidarity, a readiness on the European level has emerged with the aim to 
bear the national and regional re-allocation of resources and financial funds. As a 
4 Source: OECD (2003). 
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5 With "donating countries", we denote all those member countries of the EU that are net payers in the structural 
and cohesion funds of the EU. 
consequence, the Union was able to pursue its principal target, namely to bring 
about similar productivity and income levels across its member countries.  
But if we look into the near future, it seems that a noticeable change with regard to 
the solidarity of donating countries has occurred within the previous years. This 
applies especially to Germany, a country that has always attached great importance 
on the target to balance out inter-regional differences in the standard of living. 
Likewise, the idea of striving for inter-regional harmonization is reflected in the 
concept of co-operative federalism, a concept that is deeply rooted in the German 
constitution (Grundgesetz).  
In recent times, however, it has become obvious that Germany tends to move away 
from the aims of regional and social equalization. Although these aims once 
constituted the foundation of the German "social market economy", the German 
political agenda of reforms appears to be increasingly oriented towards Anglo-Saxon 
concepts and values. These values are mainly based upon self-responsibility and 
personal achievement on the microeconomic level and upon the stimulation of 
economic growth, productivity and innovation on the macroeconomic level. The 
adherence to these values is observable across many social groups and across large 
parts of the political spectrum in Germany. 
This change of views among policymakers and citizens alike can be explained by the 
recent historical developments in Germany. In 1990, the German reunification has 
been accomplished and highly celebrated, but in the years thereafter some major 
troubles in the internal integration process emerged. A large majority of the German 
population meanwhile seems to have exhausted the personal capacity of solidarity. 
Also, most of the richer and high-performing federal states in western Germany are 
increasingly casting doubts on the "solidarity pact" that they once signed with the 
poor and low-performing federal states in the eastern part of the country.6 This 
shrinking willingness to give financial support for poorer regions not only concerns 
the internal integration process in Germany. Perceivably, it may also affect the 
upcoming enlargement of the EU and the subsequently required support of those 
countries that join the EU in the May of 2004. In other words, the solidarity with 
                                                     
6 To stimulate and restructure the economy in eastern Germany, transfer payments from the western to the 
eastern part of Germany have amounted to some 2 trillion Deutschmarks. In the years 1993 and 1994, record 
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these new member countries of the EU can at least be questioned, since this 
changing attitude in Germany is not only a question of "willingness". Above all, it has 
become a matter of "capability". Indeed, the financial scope for the conduct of a 
policy of financial redistribution is diminishing more and more, and this is true for the 
social, regional and to a growing extent for the European sphere. The reason behind 
this process can be seen primarily in the costs of the German reunification. These 
costs become ever greater, while there is still no silver lining on the horizon in the 
catch-up of the eastern part of the country. Opposite to the initially rapid process of 
convergence, there is now empirical evidence that the five new federal states (neue
Bundesländer) got stuck in a low-level equilibrium in terms of employment, growth 
and productivity since 1995.7 From this background, there currently seems to be no 
possibility to bridge the existing and remarkable economic gaps between the two 
parts of the country. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Viewed from a broader, EU-wide perspective, it can be anticipated that the 
integration process of new EU members will also be affected if a country like 
Germany, which is the largest economy within the EU and which used to be the 
"locomotive" of the European integration process, loses its power in account of its 
internal difficulties. 
 
b) The effectiveness of the integration policy of the Union 
Almost as important as the willingness to give financial support for poorer member 
countries was the effectiveness with which the Union's administration in Brussels has 
set its ambitious goals into practice through its policy measures of financial redistri-
bution. Two important examples of effective integration policy of the EU are the 
Structural Funds, which was created in 1975, and the Cohesion Funds, which was set 
up in 1993. Both of these two funds still exist. 
In the aftermath of the current wave of enlargements, it is doubtful whether the 
integration policy instruments of the EU can work as effective as they did in the past. 
Tensions may arise because the income differentials between new and old EU 
member countries are larger than they have ever been before in the history of the 
payments of annually 220 billion Deutschmarks have been transferred from the western to the eastern part of 
Germany. 
 6
EU. As a consequence of these income differentials, enormous financial efforts will 
have to be made to foster the economic catch-up process of the new members in 
Eastern Europe, while less financial means will be available for EU countries in 
Southern Europe. Since the number of countries and regions that qualify for the 
provision of financial benefits increases with the eastern enlargement of the EU, the 
absolute level of financial support per country or region will be much lower than it 
was before. 
GDP per capita relative to the EU-15 level 
(in PPP, EU-15 = 100, all values for the year 2002)
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Chart 2:  GDP per capita in designated EU members and in selected EU-15 members relative to the 
 EU-15 average level, in purchasing power parity (PPP), 2002.8 
Therefore, we have to ask ourselves whether the Commission will be able to make 
progress in the attainment of its main goal of achieving greater equality in income 
and productivity across Europe. In view of the real economic problems with which 
the larger member countries, notably Germany, France and Italy, currently have to 
struggle, it may be required to introduce changes in the systems of regional financial 
redistribution in the Union. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
7 See Smolny and Stiegler (2003). 
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8 Source: Eurostat, Structural Indicators Database. 
c) The internal dynamics of new member countries 
Apart from the already mentioned solidarity of richer EU countries and the 
effectiveness of integration policies, the internal economic dynamics of new EU 
member countries has been a further success factor behind the growing economic 
convergence of EU countries. To initiate a catch-up process towards the leading EU-
countries, poorer EU members had to make their domestic markets more flexible, 
especially their labour markets and their capital markets. But in these countries, the 
organisation of the energy system had to be deregulated as well. In addition, the 
public infrastructure had to be improved, the tax system had to be simplified and the 
tax burden for households and firms had to be reduced. Furthermore, the quality and 
the efficiency of social and health care systems had to be enhanced. These profound 
changes, which have been initiated particularly in smaller member countries (such as 
Ireland), and the economic dynamics that these changes ignited were of great 
importance to a successful integration process in Europe.  
As for the internal dynamics in the new member countries in Eastern Europe, the 
situation will be different from earlier enlargements of the Union. Never before has 
the EU pushed its geographical growth so fiercely and never before has it taken in 
poorer countries. In addition to their low economic value added, many economies in 
Eastern Europe suffer from an unemployment rate that is almost twice as high as in 
Western European countries. Apart from that, it is the first time that former centrally 
planned economies - being still in a process of transformation towards free market 
economies - line up for joining the Union. Due to their structural weaknesses, these 
transformation economies already had to bring about major institutional reforms on 
the basis of the acquis communautaire9 in order to qualify for EU membership. But 
although the installation of these profound structural changes has resulted in a 
convergence in many institutional systems (jurisdiction, administration etc.) and also 
in an acceleration of economic growth10, there is still a lot more to be done in certain 
areas like the abatement of corruption and the destruction of powerful oligarch 
structures.  
                                                     
9 The acquis communitaire can be described as the body of common rights and obligations that is fulfilled and 
accepted by all EU members. 
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10 See Busch and Matthes (2004). 
In the following chart, this progress of institutional and economic catch-up is 
illustrated. The shown data are based on a composite indicator of convergence which 
takes account of economic, institutional, monetary and fiscal factors. 11  As the 
corresponding empirical results show, there is increasing convergence in all of the 
designated new members of the EU within the previous three years. Apart from this 
general and positive trend, it becomes manifest as well that there are remarkable 
differences in the absolute levels of convergence across the new members. At the 
lower end of the scale, we find countries such as Bulgaria and Romania. There, the 
remaining gap to EU-15 standards still amounts to 50%. At the upper end of the 
spectrum, countries such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary can be found. 
These three countries are now only some 20% below the standards as they are set 
by the EU-15 country group.  
Economic and institutional convergence of new EU member countries 
(index values of the DCEI, 100 = average level of the EU-15)
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Chart 3:  The Deka-Bank Converging Europe Indicator (DCEI). 
In spite of these remaining gaps, the pre-eminent chances of the new member coun-
tries can certainly be seen in their competitive advantage in terms of unit labour 
costs. The difference in wage levels between Eastern and Western Europe is without 
                                                     
 9
11  This indicator is called "Deka Converging Europe Indicator", abbreviated as "DCEI", and it rests on an 
evaluation scheme of economic and institutional convergence as developed by the Deka-Bank. Source: Deka-
Bank. Values for the year 2003 are forecasted. 
any question the main asset of the competitiveness of the new incoming countries in 
the short- as well as in the long-run. 
 
2.2 Political challenges: A new constitution for the EU 
The failure of the EU-summit in Brussels some months ago destroyed, at least in the 
present situation, many hopes and expectations for a new European constitution. 
The efforts made over years resulted in a void. A look at the European history, 
however, shows that such setbacks are not unprecedented events. 
In 1954, the first European constitution, the European Political Community (EPC), 
along with the European Defence Community (EVG) failed in the French national 
assembly. After that, it was an initiative by the German chancellor Adenauer that has 
lead to the ratification of the Roman Contracts of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and of the EURATOM agreement. 
In 1979, the first European parliament was elected. Headed by the Italian Altiero 
Spinelli, a sophisticated European Constitution was elaborated. Although those drafts 
first got stuck in the national parliaments and the discussion lead there, the Single 
European Act was created and the single European market was established. 
Now, which parallels can be drawn from these two cases as compared with the 
unsuccessful European Summit in Brussels and the current political situation inside 
the Union? 
The "European idea", i.e. the aims to bring about European-wide political and 
economic integration, has ever since been based on the willingness of the EU 
members to give up some facets of their national sovereignty in favour of the 
community and in order to achieve a political and stable federation of European 
nations. This readiness to realize the European idea has helped to overcome most of 
the difficulties that emerged in the course of the unification process, providing ever 
new opportunities to the enlargement of the Union as well as to the deepening of its 
integration. In retrospect, even severe situations have been used as prosperous 
opportunities to achieve increasing political coherence within the Union.  
Nowadays, however, when the recent failure of the EU summit in Brussels is critically 
assessed, we have to realize that it is becoming more and more difficult for the 
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nations involved to find Union-wide consensus in the precise accomplishment of 
further integration and enlargement.  
On the one hand, there are nations such as Poland and Spain that do not want to 
give up any further rights of national sovereignty and that insist on the status quo of 
actual agreements.12 The current contracts, though, can be expected not only to 
constitute insurmountable barriers in financial respects but also to bring about a 
considerable slowdown in the existing dynamics of integration. 
In addition, it will be even more difficult to come to terms in an enlarged Union that 
comprises 450 million citizens and (at least) 25 member countries. That is because a 
rising number of members brings about rising heterogeneity in cultural, economic 
and also in political respects. Already Public Choice Theory has taught us that under 
such circumstances, to minimize decision costs can only be achieved if majority rules, 
rather than unanimity arrangements, are implemented in political decision-making.13 
By rejecting majority rules ex ante, as it was done by some countries at the Brussels 
meeting, the costs of decision making will rise up to unexpected heights and the 
effects of specific national interests on European politics, necessarily become 
uncontrollable. 
On the other hand, there are countries such as France and Germany (recently joined 
by Great Britain) that want to accelerate the European integration process. For that 
purpose, these countries are willing to give up more of their national sovereignty as 
they already did before. In their eyes, not all the present and designated member 
countries are willing and able to keep up pace with a speed of political integration as 
it is desired by the larger and richer countries of the Union and as it has been 
prevalent in the past. Therefore, according to these largest EU countries, it may be 
necessary to accept different velocities of integration and of economic progress 
within the Union. However, this would lead to an informal partition of the EU into 
two groups of countries. One group of countries will try to keep up with the 
standards as they are set by the rules of globalisation and international competition. 
A second group of countries will attempt to catch up to the present economic 
                                                     
12 At the moment, however, the harsh attitude of these two countries against the proposed constitution seems to 
have shifted to a certain degree, due to profound and unexpected political changes in recent weeks. 
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13 See e.g. Buchanan and Tullock (1962). 
standards of the EU and will try to maintain the status quo of regional support and 
thus of financial assistance. 
All in all, the current situation seems to set off a new era in the dynamics of 
European economic integration. It seems that a policy of insisting on existing 
agreements, including the variety and the volumes of financial support programs for 
poorer countries, cannot be financed any longer. Apart from this probable change, it 
may be expected that the efforts to maintain the high levels of regional support will 
undermine the economic performance of the entire Union because these high levels 
of support slow down the economic dynamics of the most successful EU countries 
that are exposed to a severe competition of international markets. 
The questions thus are how these emerging and latent problems can be resolved and 
what instruments can be applied in a situation of rising difficulties stemming from the 
increasingly heterogeneous interests of an ever larger number of member countries 
in the EU. These issues lead us to some preliminary conclusions. 
 
2.3 Preliminary conclusions 
An easy and satisfying solution to the mentioned issues does not seem to be 
available. Looking for remedies to solve the internal problems discussed above, one 
has to consider the different economic as well as the variety of political challenges 
the EU is currently confronted with. In a nutshell, the Union now faces two huge 
demands: On the economic sphere, it has to deal successfully with a lack of financial 
means for economic integration. On the political level, it has to handle all the 
difficulties which go hand in hand with the intended implementation of a new 
constitution that needs to be acceptable for each member country.  
The current public discussion of these topics is divided into two convictions, a 
pessimistic and an optimistic one: 
The pessimistic camp is strictly rejecting any possibility to overcome the trade-off 
between financial aspects and the building of a political consensus. Policies that 
primarily focus either on the recent state of affairs or on an accelerating velocity of 
integration will lead to a severely reduced political weight of the European Union. In 
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its present colossal shape, the Union cannot be governed any longer adequately in 
the one or in the other way.  
In addition to this already deeply pessimistic estimation, the bad economic situation 
of the now financially most powerful nations is often brought into discussion. On the 
one hand, countries like Germany who belong to the group of states who pay more 
to the budget of the European Union than they receive back are almost at the end of 
their potential to cope with the financial burden imposed by Brussels. The kind of 
international redistribution which the future integration in an enlarged European 
Union would demand is no longer considered to be politically convincing to a majority 
of voters. On the other hand, those countries that have traditionally benefited from 
the European budget, like the nations in Southern Europe, and countries that are 
expecting to benefit from the support programmes, i.e. the new members in Eastern 
Europe, have high demands. At present, they are unwilling to adapt their high 
expectations to the financial bottlenecks and to the position taken by other members. 
Even worse, these poorer nations are still supported in their demands by the 
Commission itself. 
Viewed pessimistically, and in the light of the unsatisfying outcomes of the Brussels 
summit, one could anticipate that the member states will be neither able to find an 
agreement with respect to these financial affairs, nor with respect to a new 
constitution for the Union.  
Contrary to this group of pessimists and their viewpoint, there also exist a growing 
number of strong optimists. These optimists still believe in the idea of European 
integration and they euphorically rely on the healing forces of the "zeitgeist" and its 
ability to overcome the existing internal conflicts inside the EU, just as it was the 
case so many times before. In their opinion, one group of countries will be convinced 
to support the Brussels budget to a greater degree as they had planned before, and 
the other group will gain the insight that policymaking within the European Union has 
always been and will continue to be a game of playing "do ut des". While one group 
of countries will spend more money, the other group will deviate from its ambitious 
political demands and at last agree upon a reformed constitution. In this process of 
consensus-building, an important role will be played by the administration of the EU 
in Brussels. Particularly with its decision on the volume and the composition of the 
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Union's budget, it sets a fundamental and politically legitimated guidepost with 
respect to the direction and orientation of the Union's future policy of integration. 
Up to now, we have focussed solely on some of the internal problems and difficulties 
that affect the process of European integration in the near future. However, one has 
to take a more balanced and broader view and needs to consider the mighty 
challenges that develop from outside the Union. These external challenges will now 
be exposed. 
 
 
3. The challenges from outside and political consequences 
With regard to these external challenges, the main question is whether an envisaged 
solution to the above described internal problems can be able to increase the 
European competitiveness in a period of growing internationalization of business 
transactions. To fulfil this prerequisite, Europe very likely needs radical new concepts 
concerning the so-called European idea as well as the strategies and organisational 
forms to realize them. But wherefrom should these concepts come and on which 
theoretical background should they evolve? 
To focus exclusively on the European level on the convergence between European 
regions, i.e. the catching up of less developed areas to the average levels of the 
entire Union, does not seem to be enough in order to cope with the real contests of 
the 21st century. Also, this strategy of concentrating on economic convergence inside 
the Union and to distribute money across nations, regions or social groups will 
produce financial bottlenecks. The only way to create the necessary financial means 
for such a policy of redistribution is to succeed economically in the processes of 
competition in which the most developed nations or regions are involved. In such 
processes, one loses ground if one fails to bring about permanent improvements. 
Economic success in a highly developed world therefore not only includes the 
willingness to cope with dynamic processes which continuously put the established 
institutions to the test. Economic success is also built on the willingness to contend 
with a process of creative destruction in the sense of Schumpeter (1934), a process 
in which innovation is the most important driving force of growth and economic 
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progress.14 By this process, all facets of human life are deeply affected because 
economic growth of firms, regions and nations will cause an increased welfare level 
as well. 
To "cope with the best" therefore is the prerequisite for being successful in economic 
terms. Even more, it is the only possibility not only to catch-up but even to forge 
ahead. This insight has to be considered true not only for firms, but also for regions 
or nations and for the whole European Union as a distinctive and globally significant 
economic and political powerhouse. 
After the end of World War II, a new situation of global competition has emerged. 
For a long time, the USA has been the economic and technological leader of the 
world in many respects. Nowadays, however, international competitiveness has to be 
defined by the performance of the so-called "Triad", involving Northern America, 
Western Europe and East Asia. In these three regions, the standards for success are 
determined, especially in innovativeness and technological progress, since these two 
aspects are the main forces of real economic growth in the highly developed parts of 
the globe.  
Given these relationships, the European Union has already reacted. At the European 
summit in Lisbon in the year 2000, it set for itself various ambitious economic and 
technological goals. Above all, these goals entail the vision that the European Union 
should become "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world".  
But how do European nations perform in innovativeness if compared with the USA 
and Japan?  
We will have a quick look at two types of indicators that are widely used in the 
literature to approximate innovative strength, namely the number of granted patents 
on the output side of the innovation process and the level of gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D on the input side. We will first turn to the number of granted 
EPO and USPTO patents, since both measures are indications of future innovative 
success.  
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14 More detailed descriptions of this process can e.g. be found in Hanusch and Cantner (1992) or in Hanusch 
(2000). 
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Chart 4:  Granted EPO and USPTO patents per million population, by country.15  
These data clearly show that there are large disparities in patenting activity across 
the countries listed. Even inside Europe, strong differences in patenting activity are 
observable. Southern European countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) as well as the 
designated new EU member countries generate only a small number of patents and 
are far behind the leading countries, including Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Germany and the Netherlands. These latter countries can well compete with the USA 
and Japan.  
With regard to the level of gross domestic expenditure on R&D in percent of GDP, 
nearly the same picture emerges, as the following chart displays.  
                                                     
 16
15 All values are for the year 1999. Sources: OECD (2003), own calculations. Countries shown in the chart are 
ordered according to the number of granted EPO patents. 
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Chart 5:  Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP.16  
Which consequences for the future development of the EU can be drawn from these 
two comparisons? 
On the one hand, it becomes apparent that there is a group of countries within the 
Union that long has laid the foundations for succeeding in global technological 
competition. These countries entail the Scandinavian countries, the Benelux countries, 
Germany, France, and the UK. It becomes furthermore obvious that Southern 
European countries and the new member countries of the EU are technological 
laggards, at least according to the shown indicators. They do not (yet) seem to have 
the ability to compete on technological grounds on a global level, not even on a 
European level.  
In view of these cross-national differences, a rapid technological convergence cannot 
be expected, given that the development of technological strength is a cumulative, 
path dependent and long-term process. It would therefore not be surprising if an 
informal partition of the Union occurred, with one cluster of countries that is highly 
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16 Source: OECD (2003). All values are for the year 2001, unless otherwise indicated in the chart. 
competitive in technological respects, and another cluster of countries that includes 
technological laggards. This informal partition in terms of technological strength and 
competitiveness would necessarily imply that a European Union of two velocities 
developed.  
On the other hand, these national disparities will markedly concern the policy-making 
of the European Commission. Beside the objective of fostering regional convergence 
inside the European Union, the objective of improving technological strength and 
competitiveness in a global context needs to be pursued at least with the same 
priority, or even with a higher one. 
An effective realization of this latter objective requires that financial and political 
support primarily goes to those countries that already now have a strong 
technological basis. Only these countries have the "absorptive capacity"17 to allow for 
a successful utilization of the received support.  
This also means that a profound structural reform of the composition of the 
European Commission and its policy agenda will have to be brought about in order to 
fulfill the two objectives of EU-wide convergence and of technological and innovative 
strength. Within the near future, it will become apparent whether or not the 
necessary reforms can be implemented. Already today, the three largest economies 
of the Union - Germany, France and the United Kingdom - seem to have grasped 
these internal and external challenges. Obviously, they are fully aware of their 
responsibility and of their decisive role in realizing the ambitious targets that the 
Union formulated in Lisbon four years ago. 
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17 This term has been coined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) who have dealt with the learning and innovation 
capabilities of business firms. 
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